Vulnerabilities API

HTTP reference for findings — taxonomy, validation, triage, comments, evidence files, provenance, history, bulk updates, summary, quality gates and export.

All paths are relative to https://api.aleex-rank.ai/api/v2 and authenticate with X-API-Key: rk_... (see REST API). Findings hang off a pentest, so most paths begin with /pentests/{id}/vulnerabilities. For the lifecycle model — states, severity, SLAs and evidence — read Vulnerabilities.

Related surfaces live on their own pages: Retest & remediation (retest a closure, extra quality-gate rules, team policy), Evidence & audit (sealed artifacts and the audit chain), Catalogs (CWE and ATT&CK identifiers).

The finding object

GET and PATCH return the full finding inside data. The title field is vulnerability (not title). Taxonomy, validation and identity sit alongside the triage fields.

Only failed findings leave the quality gate. SLA clocks start only for validated and legacy. Human review (POST …/review) is how needs_manual_review and not_validatable become validated or failed.

{
  "success": true,
  "data": {
    "id": 42,
    "operation_id": 1203,
    "agent_id": 101,
    "pentest_id": 15,
    "vulnerability": "SQL Injection in /search",
    "description": "Boolean-based blind SQLi on the q parameter returns differential row counts.",
    "severity": "critical",
    "resolution": null,
    "status": "open",
    "priority": "urgent",
    "due_date": "2026-08-11 17:04:03",
    "sla_breached_at": null,
    "assigned_to": null,
    "assigned_by": null,
    "assigned_at": null,
    "resolved_by": null,
    "resolved_at": null,
    "resolution_type": null,
    "false_positive_reason": null,
    "created_at": "2026-08-10 17:04:03",
    "updated_at": "2026-08-10 17:10:11",
    "cvss_version": "4.0",
    "cvss_vector": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
    "cvss_base_score": 9.3,
    "cvss_severity": "Critical",
    "severity_override_reason": null,
    "cwe_id": "CWE-89",
    "cwe_name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')",
    "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-1234"],
    "mitre_attack_techniques": ["T1190"],
    "mitre_attack_technique_names": {"T1190": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"},
    "owasp_wstg_ids": ["WSTG-INPV-05"],
    "owasp_asvs_ids": ["V5.3.4"],
    "epss_score": 0.4321,
    "cisa_kev": false,
    "validation_status": "validated",
    "validation_method": "sqli-differential/v1",
    "validated_at": "2026-08-10 17:10:11",
    "confidence_score": 90,
    "confidence_rationale": "Reproduced via boolean-based blind differential on parameter 'q'.",
    "finding_fingerprint": "c9b1a0e3f2d4b5c678901234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890ab",
    "affected_asset_id": 45,
    "affected_endpoint": "/search",
    "affected_parameter": "q",
    "reproduction_steps": {
      "steps": ["Open /search", "Submit q=1' OR '1'='1"]
    },
    "request_response": {
      "request": "GET /search?q=1%27+OR+%271%27%3D%271",
      "status": 200
    },
    "reference_urls": ["https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/89.html"],
    "evidence_sha256": "e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855",
    "is_regression": false,
    "regression_of_id": null
  }
}

finding_fingerprint is a stable identity Rank computes (scope + CWE + endpoint path + parameter). The same weakness on a later pentest against the same asset updates the same ticket instead of opening a duplicate. epss_score and cisa_kev are published signals (FIRST.org / CISA); they are not writable. The host string used at ingest (affected_asset_value) is not stored — it only resolves affected_asset_id.

Look up legal CWE and ATT&CK identifiers in Catalogs.

List vulnerabilities

GET /pentests/{id}/vulnerabilities

Returns compact table rows for a pentest: identity, lifecycle, SLA and badge-sized taxonomy. Narrative, evidence JSON and replay live on GET …/{vulnId}. Supports page and per_page (default 50), and can be filtered by severity.

{
  "success": true,
  "data": {
    "items": [
      {
        "id": 42,
        "vulnerability": "SQL Injection in /search",
        "severity": "critical",
        "status": "open",
        "priority": "urgent",
        "assigned_to": null,
        "affected_asset_id": 45,
        "created_at": "2026-08-10 17:04:03",
        "due_date": "2026-08-11 17:04:03",
        "sla_breached_at": null,
        "cwe_id": "CWE-89",
        "cwe_name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')",
        "cvss_base_score": 9.3,
        "cvss_severity": "Critical",
        "validation_status": "validated",
        "confidence_score": 90,
        "cisa_kev": false,
        "epss_score": 0.4321,
        "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-1234"],
        "is_regression": false
      }
    ],
    "pagination": {"total": 1, "count": 1, "per_page": 50, "current_page": 1, "total_pages": 1},
    "risk_score": {"score": 93, "level": "critical"}
  }
}

Retrieve, update, delete

GET    /pentests/{id}/vulnerabilities/{vulnId}
PATCH  /pentests/{id}/vulnerabilities/{vulnId}
DELETE /pentests/{id}/vulnerabilities/{vulnId}

GET returns the full finding above. DELETE soft-deletes it. PATCH updates editable text, lifecycle notes and taxonomy. Status changes go through the dedicated endpoints below; assignment uses POST/DELETE …/assign.

Writable taxonomy (alongside vulnerability, description, severity, resolution, priority):

{
  "cvss_version": "4.0",
  "cvss_vector": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
  "cvss_base_score": 9.3,
  "cvss_severity": "Critical",
  "severity_override_reason": null,
  "cwe_id": "CWE-89",
  "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-1234"],
  "mitre_attack_techniques": ["T1190"],
  "owasp_wstg_ids": ["WSTG-INPV-05"],
  "owasp_asvs_ids": ["V5.3.4"],
  "affected_endpoint": "/search",
  "affected_parameter": "q",
  "reproduction_steps": {"steps": ["Open /search"]},
  "request_response": {"request": "GET /search?q=1", "status": 200},
  "reference_urls": ["https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/89.html"]
}

If severity disagrees with cvss_severity, send severity_override_reason. epss_score and cisa_kev are not writable — they are external published signals. Sending them is rejected.

Human review

POST /pentests/{id}/vulnerabilities/{vulnId}/review

Settle a finding the validator left inconclusive. Accepted only when the current validation_status is needs_manual_review or not_validatable. The conclusion is validated or failed; reason is required and replaces the validator’s rationale. Rank records validation_method as human_review and publishes vulnerability.validated or vulnerability.validation_failed (with triggered_by).

{
  "validation_status": "validated",
  "reason": "Confirmed on a staging replica with production-equivalent data"
}

{
  "success": true,
  "data": {
    "message": "Validation review recorded",
    "vulnerability_id": 42,
    "previous_validation_status": "needs_manual_review",
    "validation_status": "validated",
    "reviewed_by": 42
  }
}

This endpoint cannot rewrite an existing validated or failed verdict. If the finding is already resolved, false_positive or accepted_risk, the conclusion is stored but does not start an SLA or publish an event.

Provenance

GET /pentests/{id}/vulnerabilities/{vulnId}/provenance

Where the finding came from, and whether its structured evidence digest still matches. evidence_intact is null when the finding never had a digest.

{
  "success": true,
  "data": {
    "vulnerability_id": 42,
    "pentest_id": 15,
    "evidence_sha256": "e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855",
    "evidence_intact": true,
    "validation": {
      "status": "validated",
      "method": "sqli-differential/v1",
      "validated_at": "2026-08-10 17:10:11",
      "confidence_score": 90,
      "confidence_rationale": "Reproduced via boolean-based blind differential on parameter 'q'."
    },
    "origin": {
      "operation_id": 1203,
      "agent_id": 101,
      "agent_role": "exploitation",
      "model_id": 7,
      "model_alias": "gemini-2.5-flash",
      "provider": "google",
      "prompt_ref": "vulnerability_taxonomy_v1.md",
      "prompt_sha256": "e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855",
      "tool_invocations": [{"tool": "sqlmap", "target": "https://acme.example.com/search"}],
      "reasoning_digest": {"agents": {"101": {"stop_reason": "goal_reached"}}},
      "discovered_at": "2026-08-10T17:04:03Z",
      "recorded_at": "2026-08-10 17:04:10"
    }
  }
}

Sealed binary artifacts, the Merkle manifest and the control audit chain are documented in Evidence & audit.

State transitions

A finding is always open, in_progress, resolved, false_positive or accepted_risk. The dedicated endpoints below carry the extra data each transition needs; the generic status endpoint only moves a finding to open or in_progress.

Resolve

POST /pentests/{id}/vulnerabilities/{vulnId}/resolve

{
  "resolution_type": "evidenced",
  "comment": "Upgraded nginx and added output encoding"
}

resolution_type is evidenced (requires at least one uploaded evidence file, else 400) or without_evidence. Closing a finding can enqueue an automatic retest depending on remediation policy.

Reopen

POST /pentests/{id}/vulnerabilities/{vulnId}/reopen

Sends a closed finding back to open and recomputes its due date. Reopening a false positive clears the stored reason.

False positive

POST /pentests/{id}/vulnerabilities/{vulnId}/false-positive

{
  "reason": "Endpoint is behind authentication and not externally reachable",
  "comment": "Confirmed with the infrastructure team"
}

reason is required (max 2000 characters). This is a human triage decision, distinct from validation_status: failed.

Accept risk

POST /pentests/{id}/vulnerabilities/{vulnId}/accept-risk

{"reason": "Accepted for this release; tracked in RISK-128"}

Generic status and priority

PATCH /pentests/{id}/vulnerabilities/{vulnId}/status
PATCH /pentests/{id}/vulnerabilities/{vulnId}/priority

{"status": "in_progress"}

{"priority": "urgent"}

The status endpoint accepts only open and in_progress. Use the dedicated endpoints above for resolved, false_positive and accepted_risk.

Assignment

POST   /pentests/{id}/vulnerabilities/{vulnId}/assign
DELETE /pentests/{id}/vulnerabilities/{vulnId}/assign

The pentest must belong to a team and the assignee must be a member of it. Assigning an open finding moves it to in_progress automatically and emails the assignee.

{"user_id": 42, "comment": "Please verify the patch"}

DELETE …/assign unassigns (no body).

Comments

GET    /pentests/{id}/vulnerabilities/{vulnId}/comments
POST   /pentests/{id}/vulnerabilities/{vulnId}/comments
PATCH  /pentests/{id}/vulnerabilities/{vulnId}/comments/{commentId}
DELETE /pentests/{id}/vulnerabilities/{vulnId}/comments/{commentId}

GET returns a combined feed of user comments and automatic system entries. Filter with ?type=comment, ?type=status_change or ?type=assignment. You may only edit and delete your own comment entries (max 5000 characters).

{"comment": "Verified the fix is deployed to production"}

Evidence files

Triage uploads that prove a finding has been mitigated — distinct from sealed run evidence and from GET …/evidence (the original discovery operation).

POST   /pentests/{id}/vulnerabilities/{vulnId}/evidence-files
GET    /pentests/{id}/vulnerabilities/{vulnId}/evidence-files
GET    /pentests/{id}/vulnerabilities/{vulnId}/evidence-files/{fileId}
DELETE /pentests/{id}/vulnerabilities/{vulnId}/evidence-files/{fileId}

Upload up to 20 files per finding, each up to 10 MB, of type jpg, jpeg, png, gif, webp, pdf, txt or csv. Each file is validated by extension, declared MIME type and actual content. Upload as multipart/form-data with files[], or as base64 JSON:

{
  "files": [
    {"name": "patch-proof.png", "data": "..."}
  ]
}

Fetching a file returns a time-limited signed download URL:

{
  "id": 1,
  "vulnerability_id": 42,
  "file_name": "patch-proof.png",
  "file_type": "image/png",
  "file_size": 245760,
  "download_url": "https://storage.googleapis.com/...",
  "created_at": "2026-02-10 12:00:00"
}

GET /pentests/{id}/vulnerabilities/{vulnId}/evidence (singular) returns the original discovery evidence the agents produced, distinct from these resolution evidence files.

History

GET /pentests/{id}/vulnerabilities/{vulnId}/history

An immutable audit trail of every status change.

{
  "success": true,
  "data": {
    "history": [
      {
        "id": 3,
        "changed_by": 1,
        "old_status": "false_positive",
        "new_status": "open",
        "reason": "Confirmed the issue is real after retest",
        "created_at": "2026-02-10 14:30:00"
      }
    ],
    "total": 1,
    "page": 1,
    "per_page": 50
  }
}

Bulk status update

PATCH /pentests/{id}/vulnerabilities/bulk-status

Update many findings in one transaction — ideal for pipeline triage. Up to 100 ids, transitions limited to open and in_progress. Findings that can’t transition are skipped, not failed.

{
  "vulnerability_ids": [1, 2, 3, 5, 8],
  "status": "in_progress",
  "comment": "Triaging after scan v2.4.1",
  "reason": "Pipeline automated triage"
}

{
  "success": true,
  "data": {
    "message": "5 vulnerability(ies) updated",
    "updated": 5,
    "skipped": 0,
    "total_requested": 5,
    "errors": []
  }
}

Summary

GET /pentests/{id}/vulnerabilities/summary

A rollup for dashboards. The summary object is returned directly inside data. This counts all findings, including validation_status: failed. Quality-gate summary numbers exclude refuted findings — they are not the same denominator.

{
  "total": 45,
  "by_status": {"open": 12, "in_progress": 8, "resolved": 20, "false_positive": 3, "accepted_risk": 2},
  "by_severity": {"critical": 2, "high": 10, "medium": 18, "low": 15, "info": 0},
  "risk_score": {"score": 41, "level": "medium"}
}

Global summary

GET /vulnerabilities/summary

The same rollup across every pentest you can see, plus how many pentests that covers.

{
  "success": true,
  "data": {
    "total": 128,
    "by_severity": {"critical": 4, "high": 22, "medium": 51, "low": 40, "info": 11},
    "by_status": {"open": 30, "in_progress": 18, "resolved": 70, "false_positive": 6, "accepted_risk": 4},
    "risk_score": {"score": 38, "level": "medium"},
    "pentests_count": 12
  }
}

Validation metrics

GET /vulnerabilities/validation-metrics

False-positive rates by CWE across all pentests the caller can see. automated_fp_rate is failed / (validated + failed) for that class (null when nothing has been decided). human_false_positive counts triage false_positive status, a separate signal.

{
  "success": true,
  "data": {
    "by_class": [
      {
        "cwe_id": "CWE-89",
        "cwe_name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')",
        "total": 14,
        "validated": 11,
        "failed": 2,
        "needs_manual_review": 0,
        "not_validatable": 0,
        "unvalidated": 1,
        "legacy": 0,
        "human_false_positive": 1,
        "automated_fp_rate": 0.154
      }
    ],
    "pentests_count": 12
  }
}

This endpoint is rate-limited more tightly than pentest CRUD (30/60).

Quality gate

POST /pentests/{id}/vulnerabilities/quality-gate

Evaluate pass/fail rules against the current findings — use it to block a deploy. Only failed (refuted) findings are excluded; unvalidated, needs_manual_review and not_validatable still count.

{
  "rules": [
    {"severity": "critical", "max_open": 0},
    {"severity": "high", "max_open": 5},
    {"min_resolution_rate": 0.8},
    {"max_overdue": 0}
  ]
}

{
  "passed": false,
  "failures": [
    {"rule": "critical max_open 0", "actual": 2, "expected": 0}
  ],
  "summary": {
    "open_by_severity": {"critical": 2, "high": 4, "medium": 10, "low": 8, "info": 0},
    "resolution_rate": 0.556,
    "overdue_count": 4
  }
}

Built-in rule types: severity + max_open, min_resolution_rate (0–1), and max_overdue. Optional retest-aware rules — min_verified_resolution_rate, max_unverified_resolved, max_regressed, max_pending_retests — are documented on Retest & remediation. Team defaults for those rules live on GET/PUT /teams/{id}/remediation-policy.

Export

GET /pentests/{id}/vulnerabilities/export?format=csv
GET /pentests/{id}/vulnerabilities/export?format=json
GET /pentests/{id}/vulnerabilities/export?format=sarif
GET /pentests/{id}/vulnerabilities/export?format=defectdojo

Download every finding for a pentest.

SARIF and DefectDojo are finding exports, not sealed report formats. Sealed PDF/HTML/Markdown/DOCX/JSON reports are Reports.

Availability

Bulk status, quality gate and webhooks are gated by tier. Assignment to team members requires a team plan; individual Ultra accounts have full triage but no team assignment. See Teams & tiers. To get notified when findings change, subscribe at the tenant with Webhooks, or file tickets through Integrations.